Road traffic accidents mean lost productivity and medical expenditures. We explain trends in traffic accidents as a function of the political cycle using municipal data from Italy. We show that during municipal election years, the accident rate increases by 1.5%, with a 2% increase in the injury rate but no effect on the fatality rate. The effects are stronger in the two quarters prior to the election quarter, when the electoral campaign is at its zenith, and in the second quarter after the election, when the elected mayor takes office. We argue that this is the result of a decrease in ticket rates during election years, while expenditures in road safety increases. Our results are robustly driven by the municipal political cycle defined in different ways, and their magnitude and direction are not explained by spillover effects between municipalities. Proximity to a national police station reduces the impact of local elections on injury rates.
Introduction
Road traffic accidents are the main cause of mortality among people under age 45 and the leading cause for those between 15 and 29 (Eurostat, 2015) . While there are more than 1.25 million deaths each year on the roads, between 20 and 50 million more people suffer nonfatal injuries, which can result in temporary or permanent disabilities (WHO, 2015) . The economic losses are substantial both individually and nationwide: most countries are estimated to lose approximately 3% of their GDP in lost productivity and medical expenditures (WHO, 2015), which does not include the costs of traffic congestion and fuel waste associated with traffic accidents. As a result, reducing traffic accidents is a top priority of policy makers: the 2030 United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development includes halving the global number of road accidents among its targets. Different levels of government can play crucial roles in promoting this ambitious plan, which requires both effective traffic safety regulations and enforcement. National governments are often responsible for regulating the consumption of alcohol and the use of seat belts, child restraints, and helmets. Local governments and authorities play a tremendous role in road maintenance and direct law enforcement. Although the literature is rich on the impact of general safety measures on traffic accidents and fatalities (e.g., Cohen We focus on the role of local governments in a developed country to assess if and how the municipal political cycle affects traffic accidents and their consequences, namely, injuries and deaths. In many countries, citizens elect local authorities and, in some cases, as in the US, even local police officers. Hence, distortions associated with the political cycle might affect trends in traffic accidents by influencing law enforcement patterns at the local level. For instance, as elections approach, local politicians might want to show a strong commitment to fighting traffic accidents and increasing traffic safety, so we might expect a lower incidence of accidents in election years. On the other hand, incentives for strict law enforcement might be lower in election years since strict law enforcement might displease myopic voters, reducing political support. Voters are generally pleased with measures to fight crime while regarding a parking violation or the sending of audio messages while driving not a crime.
By exploiting staggered municipal mayoral elections from 1995 to 2016 in almost 2000 municipalities in two Italian regions -Lombardy and Veneto (representing 26.10% of all Italian municipalities and counting 15,000,000 inhabitants) -we show, that in municipal election years, the number of traffic accidents with at least one injured per 1,000 residents increases by 1.5% at the mean of traffic accidents. According to a back-of-the-envelope calculation based on a benchmark case (Section 3.2), the estimated total loss per resident is approximately 3 (2018) euros per election. We show that the main channel of this effect is a reduction in traffic tickets levied in election years. Using descriptive data on the type of tickets we recovered through the yearly reports of local police activities for a small sample of municipalities, we show that during electoral years, the incidence of tickets on serious violations does not change (speed violations and driving under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol), most likely associated with severe accidents. However, parking tickets and tickets for overall minor violations decrease (Table A. 3).
We provide evidence that while the incidence of tickets decreases, expenditures on road safety/ maintenance increase. This evidence explains our finding that while the injury rate (i.e., the number of injured per 1,000 residents) increases by 2%, the municipal political cycle has no impact on the fatality rate (i.e., the number of deaths per 1,000 residents). Pleasing voters is good, but deaths on the roads are bad. We support this finding by showing the types of accidents that increase the most are daytime and rush hours accidents as well as those occurring under good weather conditions. By contrast, the political cycle has no effect on on the most severe types of accidents, which are those occurring at night or on weekends.
Our baseline results are robust to different specifications of the municipal political cycle and to trends at the provincial (i.e., commuting routes) and local labor market level (i.e., employment rates) to exclude the possibility that the election year effect is due to a change in the likelihood of driving more (as in Parry, 2004; Miller et al. 2009 ; Bertoli et al. 2018 ; Giulietti et al., 2018) rather than changes in law enforcement, as we argue. Our findings are also robust to controlling for spatial dependence in the error term due to unmeasured factors correlated across space and affecting the frequency and severity of road crashes (e.g., traffic spillovers). Additionally, we show that alternative ways of improving road safety without targeting drivers, such as increasing the number of lights and public electricity consumption (measured in kilowatts per hour), do not follow the cycle of ticket rates and road safety/maintenance expenditures.
By exploiting quarter-level data to provide insight into developments during an election year (Akhmedov and Zhuraskaya, 2004), we show that increases in accident and injury rates are stronger during the two quarters preceding the electoral quarter, when the electoral stakes are higher, and in the second quarter following the election, when an elected mayor operationally begins serving her term. We run placebo tests, using the quarter of elections in fake electoral years (year +2 and +3 from the election year), which prove the robustness of our results.
We investigate whether part of the estimated effect could be explained as a function of other political cycles, such as those linked to national elections or to the political cycles of neighboring municipalities.
The national political cycle coincides with the mayoral cycle for only 11% of our observed elections, and it produces effects in the direction opposite to mayoral elections. National election years have a negative and statistically significant impact on accident, injury, and fatality rates. If anything, this cycle reduces the effects we estimate. However, the results on fatality rates are the only ones robust to the introduction of provincial fixed effects and trends. We do not find significant spillover effects from elections in neighboring
municipalities.
Finally, we analyze how a set of political and nonpolitical municipal characteristics channel the election year effect. We find that the positive impact of the political cycle on the injury rate increases as the political environment becomes more competitive, as proxied by a higher number of candidates. A similar effect is observed when politicians are not elected through a runoff system. The estimated effect is no different in a constituency with higher trust in local governments, as measured by the results of a referendum on more autonomy or candidates facing term limits. The result on term limits can be explained by the fact that incumbent term-limited mayors might want to support their own political party or candidate or might seek to be supported in other electoral offices, among other things (Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013; Gamalerio, 2019) . Regarding the nonpolitical municipal characteristics, we estimate a stronger positive effect of the cycle when the distance to the nearest national police station is greater, in smaller municipalities, or in municipalities that do not participate in municipal consortia to provide local services. When the municipality counts fewer registered vehicles, no differential effects result.
Our paper also relates to the strand of literature on the strategic behavior of politicians throughout an electoral cycle. Even though evidence on the link between the political cycle and fiscal policy is vast Closely related to the analysis of the public policy cycle at the local level is the work of Takako and Bessho (2018) on the employment of physicians in Japanese public hospitals, which increases in municipal election years, in line with findings for France by Clark and Milcent (2011) and for the US by Bee and Moultun (2015) . Regarding the Italian case, our evidence on the municipal political cycle affecting traffic tickets has been confirmed by Bracco (2018) . Bracco (2018) uses budget data from all Italian municipalities to show that in the electoral year, captured by a dummy for the election year and the year before the election, tickets decrease. However, Bracco (2018) does not connect the cycle to traffic accidents, to their consequences, or to other electoral cycles (i.e., national). Because of these substantial differences, our contribution provides insights into the consequences of the political cycle on health and raises concerns on the multilevel governance of services related to public safety in a decentralized institutional framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background information on the electoral system and the dataset employed. Section 3 defines the empirical strategy and robustness checks and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
Institutions and Data
Our sample is based on the municipalities of two northern Italian regions: Lombardy and Veneto. For at least two reasons, we restrict our focus to these regions: the type and representativeness of their data on traffic accidents and their homogeneity in terms of social capital. First, Veneto and Lombardy count a remarkable number of municipalities: jointly 2,110, accounting for a quarter of all Italian municipalities, which include almost 15,000,000 inhabitants. Second, they provide information at the municipal level not only on the number and severity of traffic accidents but also on the conditions under which accidents occur (e.g., the number and severity of accidents per weather condition or per time of the day). This information is otherwise not available, but it is valuable since certain types of accidents, such as those occurring at night and on weekends, are regarded as more severe than others. Even more relevant for our goals is the fact that these two regions provide accident data (i.e., only the overall number of accidents, injured, and deaths) at the quarterly level, which allows us to offer a better understanding of the dynamics during an election year.
Belonging to the northern part of the country (Figure A.1), both Lombardy and Veneto have high levels of social capital (Stella et al., 2013) . General compliance with the law, specifically with road safety laws, is strong in both regions and higher than in other parts of Italy. For instance, the incidence of seat belt use is 93% in Lombardy and 92% in Veneto. Similarly, they both report among the lowest tax evasion rates in the country (below 13%, while, for example, Campania and Calabria are above 20%) (Confcommercio, 2017) . Their high standards of law enforcement allow us to generalize the findings from this institutional setting without serious concerns that corruption or weak institutional design, as addressed by the literature on developing countries, might play a significant role.
Accidents
Italian municipalities manage approximately 10% of total public expenditures and are responsible for a wide range of services, including water supply, waste management, municipal police, infrastructure, welfare, and housing (Grembi et al. 2017 ). Specifically, they supervise the maintenance of over 62% of the national transport network (SITEB 2012). Mayors directly oversee the activities of local police forces, which are primarily responsible for the enforcement of traffic laws at the local level, together with the national police, the so-called Carabinieri.
2 Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of national and local police stations at the municipal level in our sample. Notes: The upper map shows the distribution of national police stations among municipalities in Lombardy and Veneto, while the lower map shows the distribution of local police stations. In both cases, when an area is darker, it has more stations.
We recover municipal data on the number of accidents and on the number of injured persons and deaths per accident for the periods of 1995-2016 for Veneto and 2000-2016 for Lombardy. These data refer to accidents with at least an injured person and, as such, they are recorded through the police system and collected by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). Hence, our dataset does not include accidents with no casualties, which might be considered as those more endogenously reported. 3 In an accident with a casualty (more or less severe), police intervention is preceded by a call to the emergency number, which in Italy is 112.
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Based on these data, we create three main outcomes of interest: Accident rate, Injury rate, and Fatality rate. These outcomes are calculated as the number of accidents, injured persons, and deaths per 1,000 residents. 5 We also calculate the rate of accidents, injured persons, and fatalities per type of accident, defined as accidents during rush hours (7-9 am and 5-8 pm), during the day, at night, on weekends, and under good weather conditions. These outcomes allow us to check whether the composition of accidents changes due to the election year.
Elections
Since 1993, Italian mayors have been directly elected through a runoff system in cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and through a single-round plurality rule in those with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants.
Mayoral elections are held jointly with elections of municipal councils (i.e., Consigli Comunali), and by Law n. 182, 7 June 1991, they must be held on a Sunday between April 15 and June 15 if the mayor's mandate ends in the first half of the year (January-June) or in the same period of the following year if the mandate ends in the second semester (July-December). Hence, elections are held in a staggered way across municipalities. Mayors used to serve a 4-year term, which was extended to 5 years in 2001, and they face a two-term limit. However, several exceptions to this two-term limit have been implemented over time for municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants. 6 The most recent change was introduced in 2014 (Law 56/2014), when the term limit was extended to 3 consecutive terms.
From the Italian Ministry of the Interior, we collected national and municipal electoral data for a total of 7,837 municipal elections, distributed as shown in Figure 2 . From the same source, we also recovered information on municipal budget items, such as revenues from traffic tickets, expenditures on police and on road safety, the yearly number of lights used and annual kilowatt-hour public electricity consumption. Using the budget items, we construct Ticket rate, which is equal to the number of traffic fines issued by the local police per 1,000 resident population, and Ticket revenues, which is the log of per capita traffic ticket revenues. In addition, Police expenditures and Road safety expenditures represent the log of per capita expenditures on local police and on road safety. A more comprehensive explanation of the variables is available in Table A. 1. Since for most of these budget items, the values for very small municipalities are systematically zero, we provide the baseline results on the entire sample; then, we focus on the sample of municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants (82% of the full sample) to make the analysis more meaningful. 7 This procedure means that our final sample analyzes 6,592 elections. Finally, basic municipal characteristics such as the municipal area, altitude, and population were taken from the
Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
between the two measures. The figure also highlights the main characteristic of the emergency calls dataset: the same accident results in several calls. 5 According to international standards, a traffic death is registered up to 30 days after the accident. 6 Exceptions were allowed because for very small municipalities, finding suitable candidates is not always simple. 7 Figure A .3 in the appendix shows the distribution of municipalities with more than 1,000 residents, while Figure A .4 shows the population density at the municipal level. The municipalities we drop in our preferred sample are also those with a lower population density. 
where ρ m are municipality fixed effects, γ t are the year fixed effects to capture common shocks (e.g., fluctuations in the price of gasoline), and Election year is a dummy equal to 1 for a municipal election year. Not many time invariant variables can cover the entire observational period, so we used population density, which is correlated with both the rate and severity of accidents. While Equation 1 describes our preferred specification, we also test the model in Equation 2 Outcomemt = βElection year + ρ llm + γt + πpop densitymt
In this second model, we use fixed effects for the local labor market systems to capture the commuting patterns and the labor market dynamics of residents, and we proxy them in two ways: using provincial fixed effects (12 provinces in Lombardy and 7 in Veneto) and using the local labor market units as produced by the national institute of statistics (57 units in Lombardy and 49 in Veneto). 8 T I m groups the municipal time-invariant characteristics (e.g., altitude and whether the municipality is coastal), which might affect the probability of having an accident and its severity, as well as the presence of a local and a national police station. For both models the standard errors are clustered at the provincial level to cope with serial correlation problems. The outcomes include both the rates generated using the accident data and the measures based on budget items. Table 1 reports the baseline results. For each outcome, we estimate 2 specifications for the three models.
Baseline Results
In Panel A, we present the results for the municipal fixed effects model, and the first column of each outcome is the coefficient of the election year estimated without time varying controls. Hence, the second column is our preferred specification ( (2), (4), and (6)). In Panels B and C, instead of using the municipal fixed effects, we use the provincial fixed effects (B) and the local labor market fixed effects (C). For these models, in the second column we include population density and time invariant controls, such as the number of local and national police stations, altitude and whether the municipality is coastal.
The election year has a positive and significant effect on both accident and injury rates in each specification, even though the fatality rate is never affected. According to our preferred specification, for election years we estimate a 1.5% increase in the accident rate and approximately a 2% increase in the injury rate at the mean of each variable. 9 The results are confirmed also by the models with provincial and local labor market fixed effects, in which we account for the labor commuting patterns: the magnitude slightly increases, with a +2.2% impact and a +2.5% impact on the accident rate, respectively, and no consequences on the fatality rate.
A monetary assessment of the increase in accident and injury rates is difficult to provide. We argue the main driver of our baseline results is the change in the tickets triggered by the electoral cycle. When we plot the coefficients of the election year on the budget items, as in Figure 3 , both the ticket rate and revenues decrease, while road safety expenditures increase and expenditures on local police do not. These findings are consistent with our observations using the information, available only for Lombardy, on the police force submitting the accident reports. While tickets are a target-oriented approach to road safety, road maintenance targets drivers and the community overall. Road safety might be increased other ways, for which the potential beneficiaries are not targetable and the target is the overall community, for instance, by increasing the number of lights on the streets. Hence, we check the impact of the election year on the number of lights and the number of public kilowatts consumed per hour (both normalized to the resident population), and we do not detect any effect of the election year.
To dig into the potential composition effect on traffic tickets, we collected online reports on the activities of the local police since there is no national database of local police tickets per municipality and year. We focus on two groups of tickets: tickets for M inor and Serious violations. M inor violations refer mainly to parking violations and driving in traffic zones restricted only to drivers with permits, while
Serious violations refer to driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol and to speed violations and are generally perceived as life-threatening behaviors. For a few municipalities we also have the number of kilometers registered each year by the police patrols, which could capture an increase in the intensity of activity during an electoral year. As reported in Table A 
Robustness Checks
In Hence, people could be involved in more accidents simply because they drive more (Romem and Shurtz, 2016 ). This process would suggest an alternative mechanism to the one we propose. Results in Table 2 show that the effect on accident (+1.4%) and injury rates (+1.9%) is robust to our proxy for the business cycle.
As a second robustness test, since we are dealing with road traffic accidents, we control for the impact of factors common to neighboring municipalities and correlated across space for which we cannot directly control in Equation 1, such as congestion or traffic spillovers. 13 To account for this further dimension, 11 Using provincial trends yields the same results. 12 Municipal elections are credibly exogenous to economic conditions since their timing is not at the discretion of politicians. 13 The existence of spatial dependence is confirmed by Moran diagnostics. All spatial diagnostics are available upon request. we modify Equation 1 into the following spatial error model (SEM):
where ν pt reflects the spatially autocorrelated error term and λ identifies the spatial autocorrelation coefficient of the error term. W denotes the spatial matrix for the idiosyncratic error component, and it has been specified as a contiguity-based matrix in which neighbors must share a common border. 14 As is apparent from Table 3 , the sign and magnitude of the effect of an election year are confirmed, and λ is always positive and statistically significant for both accident and injury rates, which confirms the existence of unobserved factors correlated across space affecting the outcomes of neighboring municipalities. 
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Composition Effects
According to the National Institute of Statistics (ACI-ISTAT, 2013), accident severity in the country is higher at night, largely because of greater infringement of speed limits. During weekend nights, fewer but more severe accidents occur: 43% of nighttime accidents occur on Friday and Saturday nights, when the fatality rate is approximately 42% (ACI-ISTAT, 2010). In Figure A .5, we plot the values for fatality rates and the lesivity rates (i.e., total deaths plus total injuries out of accidents) per type of accidents in our sample, and they confirm the evidence at the national level. These figures are also in line with the general trends at the European level, where the most severe accidents occur during weekends and on rural roads (European Road Safety Observatory, 2017). Hence, we investigate whether the composition of accidents experiences a political cycle: certain types of traffic violations might have a worse impact on the severity and frequency of accidents. We have only scant information on the types of tickets and the ways their composition changes, but we have data on accident types.
We estimate Equation 1 using the accident, injury, and fatality rates differentiated by 5 categories as outcomes: rush hour accidents, daytime and nighttime accidents, accidents on weekends, and accidents that occurred under good weather conditions. Additionally, we compare accidents on urban and rural roads. These checks are possible only at the yearly level, as the information on the type of accidents is not provided at a more disaggregated level. The estimated coefficients, plotted in Figure 4 , confirm our intuition, as the election year has no statistically significant effect on the accident rate during nights and weekends, indicating the most severe accidents do not increase as a result of the political cycle. The rural accident rate does not significantly change, accidents during rush hours increase, as do the injury rate records of daytime and good weather events. 
Alternative Measures of the Political Cycle
We check whether our results are driven mainly by the way in which we define the political cycle, exploiting alternative specifications to capture it. First, following Foremny and Riedel (2014), rather than considering only the election year, we add dummies for the year before and the year after an election. 16 The significance and direction of the effect due to the election year is confirmed, as shown in Table 4 , as well as its magnitude. The effect of the election year is a 1.6% increase in the accident rate (Column 2) and a 2% increase in the injury rate (Column 4). No effect is detected on the fatality rate.
Next, we consider a leads and lags transformation of Equation 1, in which we control for the yearly distance from the election year (i.e., election year=distance zero) to estimate the impact of the political cycle. We plot the estimated coefficients of this model in Figures 5, 6 , and 7. We complement the plots by also presenting the results for the estimated coefficients on Ticket revenues to provide a better idea of the opposite trend. The baseline results are confirmed independently from the selection of the reference year. 
During the Election Year
Voters' memories are commonly expected to be short term; thus, the need to secure political consensus should be stronger in proximity to the election date. We test this expectation by applying the model in Equation 5 to quarterly rates of accidents, injuries, and fatalities. 17 We define quarter 0 as the election quarter, and we retain all the observations from three quarters before the election quarter (9/11 months before the election date) to the two subsequent quarters (end of the election year). Considering more than 1 year before the election date would water down the effect of the political cycle. Considering six months after the election allows us to check what happens when the elected mayor takes office, since a couple of months generally pass before the new government becomes fully operational. Suppose, as is often the case, the election date is in June of year t (i.e., the end of the second quarter of the election year). Our sample definition means that in this specification, we use observations from July of year t − 1 (11 months before) until December of year t.
The results for the quarters specification are shown in Table 5 , where we also include quarterly fixed effects (λ q ) in addition to the usual controls and fixed effects. The results show the increases in both accident and injury rates are entirely driven by the two quarters before the electoral one and, interestingly, by the second quarter of the mayoral term. During the election quarter, we observe a negative effect on both accident and injury rates, although the effect is significant only on the accident rate. These findings shed new light on the timing of the political cycle. The need to please the constituency strikes twice during the cycle: just before the election and at the very beginning of the mayoral term. During the weeks surrounding the election date, fewer accidents are better. Table 5 stem from a sample in which we maintain only the quarters around the election quarter. Since 97% of the time the election quarter is April-June (Table 6 ), the effect we see may be seasonal, because the quarter with the highest accident and injury rates is July-September (see Figure   A .6 and Table A.4). To address this concern, we estimate Equation 5 on year +2 (-3) and year +3 (-2) from the true election year. The results of these placebo tests are reported in Table 7 . We do not assess any effect of the quarters before and after the fake election quarter. 17 We cannot repeat this analysis at the quarterly level for the budget items because data on budget items are available only at the yearly level. Notes: The reference quarter is Quarter − 3, which means 9 months before the election quarter. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.
Results of
Spillover Effects
Even though the effects of the municipal election year are robust, this result may, in part, be the result of spillover effects due to other political cycles, such as those due to national elections or elections taking place in neighboring municipalities.
We first assess the impact, if any, of national elections. National elections overlap municipal elections for 11% of the elections in our sample. The importance of the national level is twofold: Italian municipalities often rely on the financial support of the central state, and a national police force is well spread locally and can intervene in matters of road safety. Based on the 5 national election years in our sample (1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 , and 2013), we use Equation 1 to estimate the election year effect, and we report the results in Table 8 . The direction of a national election year is negative and significant: a lower accident rate, a lower injury rate, and a lower fatality rate. However, these results are not robust to the use of provincial fixed effects, but they are for the effect on the fatality rate (see Table B .3).
In the national election year, ticket revenues increase but not ticket rates, as apparent from Part We link the increase in ticket revenues to a composition effect as described by the evidence in Table   A .3: tickets for Serious violations of road safety regulations increase, as does the activity level of local police. The result on road safety expenditures relates these kinds of interventions to electoral years, and it rules out the possibility that road maintenance causes the increase in accidents when a local election is held. Overall, when municipal and national elections occur in the same year, the observed effects of local elections represent a lower bound of the true ones.
Since elections are staggered, two types of possible spillovers can occur from elections in neighboring municipalities: (1) spillovers in municipality X when no elections occur in municipality X but elections occur in the neighboring municipality Z and (2) spillovers in municipality X when elections occur in both municipality X and the neighboring municipality Z. We test these scenarios by estimating the following model:
Outcomemt = βElection year + αN eighboring election year + λInteraction + ρm + γt + πpop densitymt + p (6) β captures the effect of an election in municipality m when no elections occur in neighboring municipalities, while β+λ captures the effect of an election in municipality m when elections occur in neighboring municipalities. As shown in Table 9 , the main effect of the electoral year does not change whenever neighboring municipalities hold elections. 
Municipality Types
As the final step in our analysis, we focus only on the injury rate. Given the lack of an impact on fatality rates, injuries represent the stronger economic cost caused by the political cycle of road traffic accidents. The 5 characteristics of the political environment are 1) the presence of a runoff system, which in Italy holds for municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, since it helps to select better quality politicians (Bordignon et al. 2017) ; 2) the number of candidates running for election, proxying for high political competition; 3) the margin of victory in the election; and 4) the term limit status of the incumbent mayor. The lack of a term limit should reflect higher engagement in the political cycle. However, this last measure has two drawbacks. First, over time, several exceptions have been made to the term limit rule (two terms since 1993), the last of which entered into force in 2014 for small municipalities (those with fewer than 3,000 inhabitants). Second, local politicians care about voters' support even when facing a term limit for reasons other than their immediate re-election as mayor. They may have their own candidate to support, or they may want to run for higher office, support their own political coalition, leave a positive legacy, or run again in mayoral elections in the future (Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013; Gamalerio, 2019). As a fifth characteristic of the political environment, we consider the level of trust that local residents have in the effectiveness of the local versus the national government. We proxy for this trust level with the electoral results of a referendum for more decentralization launched by a center-right party (i.e., Lega Nord) in 2018. This referendum was run only in Lombardy and Veneto. We consider the municipal turnout levels to be an index of trust in local institutions: turnout levels were directly related to a favorable vote for more independence from the central government. Columns from (1) to (5) of Table 10 show the results for the interactions (Difference) of these first 5 characteristics. While a more competitive political environment seems to exacerbate the impact on the injury rate, facing a term limit does not produce any significant effect in our institutional framework. Having more candidates and not having a runoff system drive the effect of the election year on the injury rate.
The other 4 characteristics proxy for municipal dimensions, for which we do not control in the main specification, but which could matter in principle. We use the number of registered vehicles per resident per municipality (available from 2002) to control for the relative importance of tickets for the residence population. This channel does not produce any significant difference. We check whether any impact is due to the adherence of municipality m to a consortium of municipalities to provide public services.
Municipalities outside of a consortium have, as expected, a stronger political cycle, and the difference for municipalities belonging to a consortium is statistically different from zero. Then, we calculate the distance of each municipality to the nearest national police station (with 0 being a municipality which has at least one national police station). This measure is a more appropriate way to control for the national police interventions than using a dummy for the presence of a national police station. We define f ar as equal to 1 when the nearest national police station is at a distance above the average distance (i.e., 4.85 km or 3 miles). The effect of the election year is stronger when the municipality has no national policy station in proximity. Finally, using the distribution of the resident population, we define small municipalities as those with less than 4,070 inhabitants, and we assess the heterogeneous effect driven by this dimension: higher injured rates occur only in smaller municipalities. period of 1995-2016. During municipal election years, we estimate a 1.5% increase in the accident rate and a 2% increase in the injury rate but find no effect on the fatality rate. Our robust effects are driven by a change in the type of enforcement of road traffic laws, as captured by a decrease in the ticket rate as well as by an increase in road safety expenditures. Our analysis also sheds light on the fact that during an election year, not only the pre-election months but also the first months of the mayoral term are critical. These results of the mayoral political cycle, during which the mayor is the head of the local police force, are generalizable to other contexts in which the main officers responsible for enforcing road traffic safety measures are subject to direct elections. As such, they raise concerns regarding the side effects of decentralizing security competences. From the analysis of the channels, closer proximity to national police stations decreases the impact of election years on adverse events, suggesting that a strong presence of higher levels of government could mitigate the costs of the political cycle for road traffic accidents. Notes: The reference quarter is Quarter − 3, which means 9 months before the election quarter. TV controls= controls for population density and the presence of units of both local and state police. TI controls= controls for both altitude and whether the municipality is coastal. For a description of the variables, see 
